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Abstract
Good policy making is an art. It involves a substantial element of personal
judgement about risks and consequences of alternative courses of actions and de-
cisions. It is also a science because it requires systematic gathering and analysis
of evidence about a policy issue, and rational assessment of costs and benefits
of various ways of addressing the issue. However, in a crisis, there is little time
to gather evidence or to search for imaginative solutions to a problem. There is
a tendency, in such a situation, to act under pressure rather than on the basis of
evidence, analysis or informed judgement. Furthermore, a crisis often creates a
situation in which policy makers receive all sorts of advice. This note discusses
a set of concepts, originating mainly from economics, that can be used to assess
soundness of policy and advice, particularly during a crisis. These are concepts of
rationality, sustainability, inclusiveness, feasibility, practicality and tipping, which
can be used in decision making in normal and crisis times to reduce risks of dis-
astrous advice or policy.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D78
Keywords: Policy, risk and uncertainty, crisis, prudence, tipping.
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1. INTRODUCTION1 
 
A crisis is characterized by an unfavorable state of instability or disequilibrium, i.e., by a large 
negative deviation from the normal state of affairs. The instability can occur gradually, as when a 
country slips into deep poverty due to decades of economic mismanagement; or it can occur 
suddenly, as when for example, a country is hit by a negative external trade shock (e.g., a fall in 
the price of a major export good) or by a natural disaster such as bad weather or earthquake. In 
such situations, there is urgency in taking decisions or actions; first to restore equilibrium, and 
second, to advance pre-crisis level of welfare. Measures directed at restoration of equilibrium or 
stability are typically known as adjustment or stabilization policies, and those aimed at 
improving pre-crisis welfare can be viewed as development policies. Development or routine 
policies are framed and implemented in normal times, while adjustment policies are undertaken 
in crisis situations. A crisis is not only an emergency -- something requiring an immediate 
response, but it also has a further feature, that the appropriate response is usually unknown. It is 
this uncertainty feature that makes the design of adjustment policies extremely difficult. Thus, 
care should be exercised in making and implementing such policies. In itself, a crisis is 
undesirable, because it lowers welfare. However, in a crisis situation, a policy response to it 
presents the risk of worsening the prevailing welfare, but also the opportunity to improve welfare 
far beyond its pre-crisis level. Thus, a crisis has two conflicting aspects. Its negative impact or 
the threat of such impact is a bad thing, while the opportunity for improvement that it presents is 
a desirable thing. More generally, policy can harm or benefit the population in normal or crisis 
periods depending on how it is designed and implemented. However, the risks for harm and 
opportunities for gain are greater in crisis periods.     
 
Ideally, public policy should never harm the nation and its people.2 Its intended purpose is to 
advance the common good, unless it is in the hands of decision-makers who are not responsive to 
                                                          
1 A previous and more detailed draft of this paper was presented in March 2003 at an induction seminar organized 
by the Office of the President  for the then newly appointed Cabinet of the Government of Kenya. The then Vice-
President, Hon, Kinjana Wamalwa requested the authors to complete the paper and circulate to the Cabinet and 
senior civil servants. He particularly wanted the idea of prudent policy making articulated.  Unfortunately, many 
policies initiated by the new government of Kenya in response to various crisis situations fail to meet the conditions 
of prudence.  We dedicate this note to Hon. Wamalwa who passed away not long after the induction seminar. 
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public needs and concerns.3 However, policy can have disastrous outcomes if it is ill-conceived 
or badly implemented. Since this risk is greatest during a period of crisis, how can one decide the 
right thing to do in such a situation? This question applies to everyone -- an individual, the 
family unit, the government, etc. In many ways, this is the ultimate survival question, because 
the outcome of an action or an inaction in a crisis  can be disastrous. There is no easy alternative 
in a  emergency situation. It is the hard choices inherent in a crisis, and their far-reaching 
consequences, that are often the source of panic and poor judgement on the part of decision-
makers and advisors in such a period. 
 
The aim of this note is to use basic economic analysis to unravel the steps and principles that can 
be followed to make rational decisions in crisis situations. In view of the wide scope of the issue 
involved, we restrict ourselves to crisis decisions and actions by policy-makers in government. 
We make the simplifying assumption that an action follows automatically from a decision, so 
that policy decisions and actions are used synonymously. We view advice, as a set of ideas that 
guide policy makers in choosing from among policy options. Advice is given by experts, who 
typically have no power to effect the advice. We view policy as a purposeful action or a credible 
statement by persons in authority4. Advice precedes policy. That is, if knowledge is to be used to 
inform policy, it must be available to policy makers beforehand. Advice is useless, if it is given 
to policy makers after the fact.  
 
2. POLICY MAKING IN A CRISIS  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2 Every public policy is associated with losers and gainers. However, the net effects should be positive benefits. 
From a society’s point of view, benefits from a policy should be large enough to compensate the loses.  
3 One of the basic premises of Public Choice School is that individuals act on their self- interest whether in public or 
private settings. As such, decision makers select those choices that maximize their own utility subject to institutional 
constraints. Unless institutions of governance that constrain their behavior are in place, policy choices may largely 
benefit a few people at the expense of the general population.  The case of the rare benevolent dictator 
notwithstanding, we assume democratic institutions of governance exist, and the primary intent of public policy 
under these institutions is to maximize social welfare. 
4 Policy is also variously defined as (a) "a definite course of action or method of action selected from among 
alternatives in light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions";  (b) "what is 
articulated, whether in writing or by word of mouth"; (c) "what is done, whether it has been stated before or not"; (d) 
"only such actions that are sustained"; (e) "purposeful statements, written or spoken, aimed at solving a particular 
problem" (see Gitu, 2001). While policy is made by rulers, its implementation is the responsibility of its agents. 
Good policy promotes good governance and advances the general well-being of the population while bad policy has 
the opposite effect. Unfortunately, both the science and art of good policy making are rare among researchers and 
decision makers, and this situation might account for much of the poverty observed in the world.        
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During normal times, such as characterized by peace, social and policy stability or when the 
economy of a nation is experiencing steady economic growth, adherence to existing policy is 
often the norm. Policy focus then is on routine management of the economy to ensure that 
existing conditions prevail or improve slowly. Under such conditions, policy is conducted 
without much urgency: the public is content and demands for action are often limited to marginal 
changes in the policy direction.  In fact, policy makers are often encouraged to stay on course. 
During such good times, policy advisers have the luxury of time to consider and evaluate 
alternative policies that would make the situation better or at least ensure that things remain as 
are.  As a matter of fact, such times afford policy makers the opportunity to experiment with 
marginal changes in policy with little fear for adverse consequences. The textbook prescription 
of policy making fits well during such good times. It is fair to say that most policy advisors are 
trained to offer advice to governments assuming normal state of affairs. 
 
However, during a crisis, as for example when there is widespread social unrest, or when an 
economy is in a deep recession, this textbook approach fails.  Crisis brings forth a need for 
urgent action and results.5 It is also a time when error in policy choice can be extremely costly. 
More specifically, during crisis, both Type I error (accepting bad advice) and Type II error 
(rejecting good advice) have much more serious implications than is the case during normal 
times.6 For reasons discussed below, times of crisis also associate with a high probability of 
committing both types of errors in policy choice. Policy makers must therefore not only rely on 
credible advisors but must also have a systematic way of evaluating the soundness of advice that 
they receive from experts.   
 
                                                          
5 As of the time of writing the first draft of this  note, the new Kenyan Government was  faced with various sorts of 
crisis situations. Most important was  an economy in terrible condition as evidenced by high unemployment and 
poverty and  stagnant growth. Likewise, the country was  experiencing various incidences of social unrest most 
important being the Mungiki menace, uncertainties about the new constitution and labour unrest. All these issues 
required urgent actions and public expected immediate results. 
6 A good example of the seriousness of making errors during crisis can be illustrated by the familiar case of 
convicting an innocent person for murder which caries a death penalty.  In a case where a person is charged with 
murder, finding him guilty while he is in fact innocent result in serious consequences—hanging an innocent 
person—an irreversible action. Thus, those types of cases call for very careful scrutiny of the evidence.   We equate 
the gravity of an error in policy advice during crisis to that of convicting an innocent person for murder. 
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Policy choice during crisis demands special attention because mistakes can make the crisis worse 
with serious consequences on the well-being of the population. We use the concept of “tipping” 
to characterize the irreversible negative impact of wrong polices during a period of crisis.  
Tipping is used here to imply a situation whereby a condition accelerates in the wrong direction 
as a result of policy action or inaction. One could think of the case of an economy in a severe 
recession or depression as being in a crisis state. During such times of economic crisis, policy 
concern must be to halt the decline and reverse the downward trend.  Policy mistakes during 
such times result in an acceleration of the decline in economic performance making it even more 
difficult for the economy to recover and plunging the population  into widespread suffering.  
Likewise, in times of social crisis, policy choices could tip the social condition, resulting in a 
social tragedy.  For example, organized social unrest by small groups could easily degenerate 
into civil war if inappropriate measures are taken. It is because of this “tipping” effect of wrong 
policy in undesirable direction, and with disastrous consequences, that we consider policy 
making during a crisis to be unique, and deserving of systematic thinking.  We can therefore 
define good policy during times of crisis as that policy with a “zero” or  low probability of 
tipping over the existing condition into a worse state. 
 
Policy making during times of crisis is  even more complicated because the demand for action is 
very high. Policy makers are expected to act fast to deal with the crisis. The public demand for 
results imparts political pressure for urgent response. Given such pressure, policy makers are 
inclined to take measures that are expected to have a high positive impact and thus resolving the 
crisis.  We suggest that, just like investment options with high returns also have high risks, 
policies that can have a major impact in reversing a crisis also associate with a high risk of 
failure — that is high probability of tipping.  We do not equate “successful” policies with “good” 
policies (see e.g., Jaffe, 1975; Peacock, 1992; Jones and Cullis, 1991; Peacock, 1984; 1977; 
1993). In other words, although an investor can place all his  assets in high risk-high return 
investments and actually be successful thereby increasing his net worth, one should consider that 
the probability of bankruptcy at the time of investment  is very high. In as far as public policy is 
concerned, success of such high risk actions does not represent good policy because of the 
associated high probability of tipping the welfare of society..  The interaction between pressure 
to act and the promise of rapid problem resolution increases the probability that policy makers 
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will opt for high risk policies during times of crisis. Crisis tempts otherwise prudent policy 
makers to behave like gamblers. There is need to design an institutional mechanism (such as 
crisis resolution committees) for insuring policy making against decision behaviors associated 
with tipping (see below). 
 
Another dimension of policy-making that complicates the choice process during crisis has to do 
with the supply of policy proposals. A crisis creates experts of all sorts. The deeper the crisis, the 
larger the supply of “expert” opinion. On the one hand, the policy makers face demands to act, 
and on the other, they are offered numerous suggestions and are therefore expected to act and do 
so fast.  Unfortunately, most of the policy proposals that are made to the policy makers are 
poorly informed.  In a crisis, most proposals fall under what might be called “folk” policies. Folk 
policies are not based on any scientific evidence of "cause-and-effect" or clearly demonstrated 
relationships.  Instead, folk policies are based on beliefs, practices, casual evidence and value 
judgements (Ng, 1972).  The basis for folk economics or science for example, are mere beliefs as 
to how the economy or the world works.  Folk policies offer little guidance in complicated 
matters, as they contain elements of common knowledge and experiences with no innovation. 
They are likely to be a large menu of mostly high risk policies. 
 
3. STANDARD POLICY ACTIONS DURING A CRISIS 
 
In a crisis situation, well intentioned policy advisors are inclined to recommend one of the 
following courses of actions or policies: 
 
• Shock therapies; 
• Incremental or gradual steps; 
• Radical actions. 
 
We provide a brief description of each of the above policy categories below. 
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The idea of “shock therapy” is derived from the medical field. It is the type of treatment provided 
to patients in extreme emergency cases such as a heart attack or when there are few treatment 
options for an illness. It is also the type of treatment given to a substance addict by suddenly 
withdrawing the whole of the substance from the subject. A shock therapy can either cure or kill. 
It has no intermediate outcome. It is thus a very risky course of action to take. A particular 
characteristic of shock therapy is that once a situation gets worse, there is little else that can be 
done. The action is irreversible.  It is a once and for all action.  
 
A radical action or policy can be seen as one that changes the way of doing things in an almost 
the opposite direction. In a country characterized by large inequities in the distribution of key 
productive resource such as land, a radical policy would be one that implements land 
redistribution by a decree. While achieving the intended outcome, a radical policy often creates 
many other problems — it could, for example, lead to a drastic fall in output or create social 
tensions. Likewise, during times when interest rates and prices are escalating, a radical policy 
would be to institute controls in form of price ceilings.  Here again the policy creates numerous 
other unintended outcomes though initial objective (lower prices and interests rates) may appear 
to be achieved.  Again, the policy achieves that narrow objective but creates numerous other 
unintended outcomes. Radical policies can be reversed though the costs of policy reversal can be 
very high. By and large, the short-run gains that accrue as a result of radical policies dissipate 
rapidly as they are not sustainable. 
 
Incrementalism or gradualism is to an extent the opposite of radicalism. It is the type of policy 
making characterized by marginal changes in existing policy. During a crisis, such an approach 
to policy may only have limited impact, as it does not lead the economy or the country away 
from its previous trajectory. The problem with such measures is that they may not bring about 
the required changes.  
 
The pressure to show results tends to make shock therapy and radical policies attractive to policy 
advisors and makers. Such policies are easy to sell to policy makers who are keen to maximize 
popularity by showing some quick wins. We suggest that these policies are not generally suitable 
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during times of crisis and a higher level of scrutiny is called for before making or implementing 
them.   
 
The above policy measures appear mutually exclusive only under a casual examination. For 
example, it may not be necessary to apply only radical or only gradual measures in reforming 
economies. Radical and gradual policies can be applied simultaneously or can be sequenced to 
achieve well thought out objectives. With regard to the first point (complementary application of 
dissimilar policies), a radical measure can be directed at one problem in the economy, while a 
gradual one is being aimed at another problem. For example, in a financial reform, interest rates 
can be decontrolled overnight (a radical measure), even as bank deregulation is introduced 
gradually (an incremental reform). An example in which radical and gradual reforms are used in 
sequence is also easy to find. Immediate removal of destitute families and children from the 
streets, followed by their gradual rehabilitation into worlds of work and schooling, is a perfect 
example of sequencing of radical and incremental policies in a way that is consistent with short-
and long-term public interests (see below). An appropriate response in a crisis situation is one 
that addresses the urgency of the moment, while at the same time searching for a better and long-
term solution. 
      
 
4.  PRUDENCE IN A CRISIS SITUATION 
 
Given the high cost associated with the adoption of wrong policies during crisis, we suggest that 
policies adopted in such a period should at least meet the conditions of prudence. We define 
prudent policies as those policies that are least likely to be disruptive of a nation and its people. 
Such policies are robust in principles of feasibility and practicality. 
 
We outline below decision rules that can increase chances of making and implementing prudent  
policies in a crisis situation.          
  
Adherence to a small set of ideas when making policy decisions can reduce extreme risks 
associated with policies in periods of crisis. These are concepts of risk averting attitude (not 
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behavior), diversification behavior, sustainability, inclusiveness, fall-back strategies, broad 
feasibility and calmness in the midst of a crisis.  
 
A policy is prudent if it can be said to be: 
a. Averse to excessive risks, i.e., it should not plunge the country into chaos or extreme 
dangers if it fails. A risk averting attitude on the part of policy makers and advisors is 
more likely to avoid disastrous policies compared with a risk taking attitude. There is 
need, therefore, for policy makers and advisors to cultivate or develop risk averting 
temperaments.  We take it as axiomatic that such attitudes or temperaments can be 
learned or acquired. The difficulty of course is that attitudes are not observable and so 
one cannot differentiate individuals by their attitudes towards risk. However, a record of 
the nature of a policy maker's decisions can reveal her/his attitudes towards risk. This 
information can be useful in selecting members of decision committees (see below). 
 
The idea here is to weigh the beneficial consequence of each policy option with the 
associated dangers. For example, a policy option with a large potential benefit might also 
be highly dangerous, while a policy yielding smaller benefits might carry modest risks of 
harm. In this case, the risk averting nature of prudence dictates a preference for the policy 
with smaller benefits. From this standpoint, doing nothing and maintaining the existing 
status quo might be a prudent policy. However, a policy of a status quo would be most 
imprudent if it sacrifices opportunities for a large gain to avoid small risks. Since 
decisions are always made in the context of uncertainty, the concept of prudence dictates 
that policies under contemplation be assessed based on probabilities of risks and benefit 
opportunities associated with them. The probabilities can be objective, or they can simply 
be degrees of belief as to magnitudes of risks and opportunities associated with particular 
policies.    
b. Diversified, i.e., comprises different elements or strategies, all aimed at achieving a given 
objective.  In this case, some strategies would be high risk and others would be low risk. 
The manner in which such a policy is designed and implemented ensures that extreme 
risk is avoided.  For example, if a high risk strategy fails, as a low risk one succeeds, the 
attendant loss would be mitigated by benefits of the successful strategy. A concrete and 
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well-known example of a diversified policy is a trade policy based on many export 
commodities rather than one dominant crop such as coffee or tea. A policy consisting of 
military and diplomatic initiatives in resolution of a border dispute is another example. 
c. Politically sustainable, i.e., maintained over political regimes or over several 
development periods. A policy option that is likely to find support in different political 
regimes is likely to be based on long-term national considerations rather than on 
expediency or short-term objectives of a particular regime. A policy based on long-term 
goals has an inherent tendency of avoiding disastrous outcomes of measures intended to 
achieve short-term ends of a given regime. 
d. Inclusive, i.e., based on inputs from different cross-sections of society. The idea here is 
that crisis decisions, albeit their urgency, should not be left to one person or to a few 
individuals, but should be made by a committee comprising a representative group of 
individuals. To the extent possible, there should be wide participation by citizens in such 
decisions, through debates by civil society, non-government organizations and elected 
representatives of the people. Moreover, incidence of benefits or costs of the decisions 
made should be widely shared in society. This implies that mechanisms for sharing such 
benefits and costs should be available. 
e. Supported by a fall-back strategy, i.e., it specifies the course of action that would be 
taken if the preferred or the first best strategy were to fail. A fall-back strategy can be a 
second-best option, an exit strategy or a plan to terminate the policy whenever it becomes 
evident that it would not work. Thus, there are three alternative elements of a fall-back 
strategy. One might involve a plan to exit from a failed program of action or from 
unworkable manifesto. The second could be a plan to terminate a policy once its failure is 
imminent. And a third element might comprise a different program of action, which 
differs in risks and opportunities from the preferred action. A prudent policy should 
contain all the three elements. Ordinarily, policy makers and policy advisors do not 
consider a comprehensive set of fall-back strategies because of the pressure to act fast. 
The impatience involved in crisis decisions is often the source of disastrous consequences 
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often associated with such decisions. The necessity to have an exit strategy suggests that 
choice of policies should also take into account the magnitude of sunk costs.7    
f. Feasible, i.e., can be implemented with available resources. However, a financially 
feasible policy can fail to be implemented if it is not practical. For example, a policy for 
elimination of child labor may remain on paper despite the availability of resources to 
carry it out, if a mechanism for recruiting working children to schools and to 
rehabilitation centers does not exist. Similarly, a program for rehabilitating street families 
within a month may fail for practical reasons, such as non-availability of shelter, which 
cannot be constructed in one month. Thus, practical or technological aspects of policy 
decisions are as important as the conceptual, social, economic and inter-temporal 
dimensions discussed earlier. Institutional arrangements are key in determining 
practicality of policies.  Since institutions are created by the polity or evolve out of social 
norms and conventions (see North, 1990), feasibility of policies under a particular 
institutional structure (comprising for example, a constitution, a legal system, manifestos 
of political parties, prevailing social norms), is determined taking into account the 
political realities of the day.     
g. An result  outcome of a calm decision making process. A crisis tends to cause panic and 
anxiety among policy makers because of the urgency of the response it requires. Under 
such circumstances, there is danger that action or policy will be based on mere feelings 
(e.g., anger, emotion, sympathy, impatience, fear etc.) or wishful thinking, rather than on 
reasoning and analysis. It is important that policy makers and advisors be calm in a crisis 
situation to facilitate careful consideration of key policy options. Rationality is the most 
important calming device in a crisis situation. It introduces objectivity in a decision 
process, i.e., the need to base decisions on evidence and reason. Further, it facilitates 
selection of a policy that is in the best interest of society because by its very nature, 
rationality demands that policy makers compare costs and benefits of alternative courses 
of action8.    
 
                                                          
7 Simply, as economic theory teaches us, high sunk costs are a significant barrier to exit. We therefore take it that 
policy choices that have low sunk costs are easier to exit from should the policy produce undesirable results. 
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In order to use the  above concepts  in making decisions, it is important to institutionalize the 
general process of making  decisions of a polity nature. This institutionalization can be done by 
constituting committees with mandates for making routine and emergency decisions. Thus, once 
a decision matter has been identified as being of a particular type, it can be delegated to an 
appropriate committee for consideration. The implication here is that even as urgent actions are 
taken, there should be institutional mechanisms for managing a crisis, with long-term and broad 
development goals in mind.  
 
An important aspect of institutionalized decision committees is that they introduce calmness in 
decision making, especially in crisis situation. Calmness avoids haphazardness in arriving at 
policy conclusions. A committee is a good institutional mechanism for bringing calmness in 
decision making process because its members are forced to rationalize their contributions so that 
only the most compelling, or well reasoned or practical policy proposals would tend to be 
accepted by all committee members or by the majority of the members. As a matter of routine, 
the committee should always strive to be informed by evidence, facts, and by current scientific 
knowledge as well as by moral arguments before arriving at policy conclusions. Emphasis on 
rationality in decision-making should introduce calmness in decision committees and generally 
lead to prudent policies.   
 
5. REAL WORLD EXAMPLES OF CRISIS POLICIES 
 
There are many examples in various parts of the world that can serve as excellent case studies of 
policies in crisis situations. Land redistribution policies after independence or revolutionary 
changes in political regimes are good examples. Land redistribution policies in the former Soviet 
Union in the early part of the 20th Century are examples of policies designed and implemented in 
crisis circumstances. Similar land redistribution policies characterized Kenya and Tanzania in the 
early 1960s, China in the late 1940s, and Costa Rica in 1970s, just to mention a few cases. 
Uganda's property confiscation policies of the 1970s are particularly worthy of note. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8 Since policy makers act on behalf of society, this is equivalent to stating that rationality in a decision process helps 
policy makers maximize the social objective function. 
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In some countries, policies made in periods of crisis resulted in extreme suffering of the 
population, while in others they led to prosperity. Radical policies or those of the shock therapy 
variety generally led to suffering while prudent policies improved living conditions (Appendix 
Table 1). Some radical policies, that registered short-term successes, as in the former Soviet 
Union, had long-term disastrous consequences. Appendix Table 1 depicts examples of crisis type 
policies, their classification and consequences. 
 
Appendix Table 1 is only an illustrative example of the types of policies that fit the policy 
classifications in the text. It is by no means intended to be a detailed or an exhaustive list of 
policy typologies.  It is generally difficult to find prudent crisis policies because in a period of 
crisis, policies tend to have a short-run orientation. The decision principles discussed in this note 
are intended to guard against the temptation to go for disastrous policies or those that yield short-
run, unsustainable gains.  
   
6. CONCLUION: JUDGING SOUNDNESS OF ADVICE AND POLICY  
 
The components of prudence (e.g., risk aversion, feasibility, practicality) can be fruitfully used to 
assess whether the expert advice being given or the policy being contemplated is sound or not. In 
particular, the concept of risk aversion can be used to determine whether adverse consequences 
of expert advice (and the attendant policy) are tolerable. Further, the concept of feasibility can be 
employed to determine whether the policy being advocated is affordable. Judging policy in 
relation to its practicality can reveal problems in its implementation. The main contribution of 
this note is to provide rigorous and intuitive standards for judging whether an advice is sound or 
not. The note can help determine whether the advice or policy is well considered, and whether, 
its short- and long-run consequences are acceptable. The concepts can be used to evaluate any 
advice or policy. The standards of decision-making discussed here constitute a mechanism for 
forcing advisors and policy-makers to rationalize their positions individually or jointly even 
when the subject matter of advice or policy is extremely urgent.  The process of rationalization, 
by its very nature, elevates the role of reason to that of the pillar of the decision making process, 
thus reducing risks of ill-conceived policies. Indeed, casual policies are ruled out by the 
decisions standards discussed here.    
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Expert advice, public policy and social welfare are closely linked. Bad advice can lead to 
policies that are disastrous to the well-being of the population. It is thus of utmost importance 
that advice and policies be carefully evaluated, especially in periods of crisis when human 
judgment is most prone to error. The decision standards of prudence can be used to reduce 
adverse consequences of public policies.     
 
As a final remark, we emphasize the fact that policies that result in what may be called good 
outcomes do not necessarily meet our standards of prudence. By definition, these policies are not 
“good’ from the normative point of view as discussed in this paper. Currently in Kenya, the 
government is implementing two radical (by our definition) policies that by all accounts are 
considered a success. The first has been the demolition of buildings and other structures that are 
constructed in areas reserved for public utilities.  The second one has been the mandating of the 
fitting of seatbelts on all public commuter vehicles.   Both of these policies have been enacted in 
response to what may be called crisis situations. While they have been implemented and many 
consider them a success, these policies in our view are not prudent in that they do meet the 
features of prudence. The policies may therefore not be sustained through different regimes; do 
not appear to have undergone careful evaluation of benefits and costs; and there are clearly no 
fallback strategies.  
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APPENDIX TABLE 
 
Table A1 
A Typology of crisis policies in different parts of the world 
 
Policy and Nature of Crisis 
Country or Region 
and Date 
Classification 
(radical, 
gradual, prudent 
etc) 
Short-run 
performance 
(failed, 
succeeded) 
Long-run 
Consequences 
(good, bad, 
disastrous, etc) 
1. Land Reform due to political agitation 
after independence 
Kenya, 1963-66 Prudent Succeeded Good 
2. Property confiscation Uganda, 1971-74 Radical Succeeded Disastrous 
3. Property nationalization after 
independence and declaration of a 
socialist state 
Tanzania, 1967-70 Gradual Succeeded Disastrous 
4. Reorganization of property rights by 
fiat  and forced villagization under 
pressure from socialist ideals  
Tanzania, 1961-73 Gradual Failed Disastrous 
5. Kenyanization of private enterprises 
and civil service under pressure from 
interest groups in the face of rural-urban 
migration and mounting urban 
unemployment  
Kenya, 1963-70 Gradual Succeeded Good 
6. Creation of state enterprises under 
pressure from socialist development 
ideals  
Developing 
regions, 1960s-
1980s 
Gradual Succeeded Bad to 
Disastrous 
7. Structural adjustment programs in the 
poor governance and growth 
Eastern European 
Countries and 
USSR, 1990s 
Radical and 
shock therapies 
Succeeded Mixed 
8. Structural adjustment under heavy Sub-Saharan Gradual Succeeded Bad 
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external debts and negative growth rates  Africa, 1980-90s 
9. Political liberalization under pressure 
from opposition political parties and 
international development agencies   
Kenya, 1990-2002 Gradual Failed to 
Change 
Leadership 
Good 
10. Political liberalization under 
pressure from armed opposition and 
international opinion 
South Africa, 
1960s-94 
Gradual Succeeded Good 
11. Political liberalization under 
pressure from armed under-class 
Cuba Radical Succeeded Good 
12. Equal protection by government of 
all citizens against demands from radical 
political groups after independence 
South Africa, 1994 Prudent Succeeded Good 
13. Inaction against ethnic violence 
under pressure from special interest 
groups  
Kenya, 1990s Gradual Succeeded Disastrous 
14. Foreign exchange and trade 
liberalization under pressure from 
Bretton Woods Institutions  
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Gradual Succeeded Good 
15. Free and universal primary 
education under pressure from NARC 
campaign promises 
Kenya, 2003 Prudent In progress Not observed 
16. Mandating seatbelts and speed 
governors on commuter vehicles  
Kenya 20044 Radical In progress Not observed 
17. Demolitions of private structures and 
buildings on land reserved for public 
utilities 
Kenya 2004 Radical In progress Not observed 
18. Shoot to kill suspected thieves order 
given by the Minister for National 
Security, Kenya in response to rising 
crime. 
Kenya 2005 Radical Not yet 
implemented 
Not observed 
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